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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: The findings of two field studies of acoustic
sensing systems designed to detect
the sound of a muzzle blast from a
gun and, within seconds of the shot
being fired, triangulate within some
margin of error the location from
which the shot was fired, before
alerting the police about the gunshot. The research team examined
the effectiveness of Trilon Technology's ShotSpotterTM system,
which the local police department
has operated in Redwood City,
California, since early 1996, and
the Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s
SECURES™ system, which police installed for 2 months in a neighborhood with high levels of random
gunfire in Dallas, Texas, in 1996.
This Research in Brief also outlines
how the police used the technology
in Dallas and what officers working
in the study sites think of gunshot
detection systems.
Key issues: Anecdotal evidence
from the media and interviews with
local officials, police, and community members suggests that random
gunfire is considered a serious
problem in many large cities in the
United States. Random gunfire has
been defined as "the indiscriminate
discharge of firearms into the air,"
which generally occurs during holilS, during weekends
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Random Gunfire Problems and
Gunshot Detection Systems
by Lorraine Green Mazerolle, Cory Watkins, Dennis Rogan, and James Frank

Random gunfire is a significant problem in many large cities throughout the
United States. 1 Random gunfire has been
defined as "the indiscriminate discharge
of firearms into the air," which generally
occurs during the celebration of holidays,
during weekends or sporting events, and
often in the context of drinking. 2
Communities across the United States
have instituted a variety of efforts to reduce random gunfire problems, including
public awareness campaigns and the use
of technological devices to detect and
alert the police to incidents of gunshots
and explosions. Generically known as
"gunshot detection systems," the technology includes an acoustic sensing system
capable of identifying, discriminating,
and reporting gunshots to the police
within seconds of a shot being fired. 3
This Research in Brief summarizes the
findings of field studies of two gunshot
detection systems: Trilon Technology's
ShotSpotter™ system, which has operated in Redwood City, California, since
early 1996, and Alliant Techsystems
Inc.'s SECURES™ system, installed
for 2 months in 1996 in a neighborhood
with high levels of random gunfire in
Dallas, Texas. This Research in Brief
also outlines how the police used the
gunshot detection system in Dallas and
what officers working in the test sites
think of the technology.

What is known about
random gunfire problems
Random gunfire problems are distinguishable from other types of shooting
incidents such as urban sniper attacks,
gang shootouts, domestic homicides, and
revenge shootings because (1) random
gunfire is strictly an outdoor activity;
(2) it is not usually part of other criminal
activity such as drug dealing, assaults,
or robberies; and (3) random gunfire
shooters do not fire their weapons to
intentionally injure or kill people.
In many U.S. urban areas, random gunfire
is considered a problem, typically involving people drinking alcohol and watching
televised sporting events and then walking outside to fire their weapons into the
air in celebration. People also tend to
fire their weapons on New Year's Eve,
Cinco de Mayo, Fourth of July, and other
significant holidays. Police report that
random gunfire shooters believe their
actions are harmless. Shooters state that
firing their weapons in the air does not
endanger lives or damage property. 4
Policymakers, police department personnel, city prosecutors, and community
residents across the United States have
implemented a variety of initiatives to
control serious shooting and other gunrelated problems. 5 Yet only a few local
governments have developed programs
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gunfire is strictly an outdoor
activity; (2) it is not usually part of
other criminal activity such as drug
dealing, assaults, or robberies; and
(3) random gunfire shooters do not
fire their weapons to intentionally
injure or kill people.
Residents in communities with high
levels of random gunfire live in perpetual fear; and law-abiding business owners and residents freely
express their willingness to abandon or relocate from a neighborhood with random gunfire
problems.

Key findings: The study of the use
of gunshot detection technology
in local law enforcement led the
research team to four broad
conclusions:
• Gunshot detection systems are
likely to reveal rather high citizen
under-reporting rates of random
gunfire problems (23 percent of
incidents are reported).
• The technology is likely to increase the workloads of police
officers, particularly if departments
dispatch a patrol unit to every
gunfire incident detected by a
technological system.
• Gunshot detection systems are
not likely to lead to more arrests
of people firing weapons in urban
settings because it is highly unlikely
that offenders will stay at a gunshot location long enough for the
police to arrive.
• Finally, gunshot detection
systems seem to offer the most
potential as a problem-solving tool
and would fit nicely within the
emerging problem-oriented policing paradigm. The technology can
help police identity random gunf1re
hot spots and develop strategies to
address the problem .

Target audience: Local police
administrators, local government
officials, community groups, and
researchers.
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problems. In cities such as Dallas (the
police department's Gunshot Awareness
Program), New Orleans (Gunshot Public
Awareness Program), Redwood City
(Operation Silent Night Program), and St.
Louis (Town Criers' Program), community
awareness campaign volunteers and the
police work together to inform people of
the dangers of random gunfire.
Anecdotal evidence from newspaper
articles," television broadcasts, 7 and
interviews with police department officials11 and community members'J suggests
that random gunfire is a serious problem
in many cities. Residents in these communities live in perpetual fear: they worry
that a stray bullet will kill an innocent bystander; they feel they live in the middle
of a war zone on some nights; they hide in
their homes, afraid to confront the people
disrupting their lives; and law-abiding
business owners and residents are willing
to abandon or relocate from a neighborhood with random gunfire problems.H 1
One Redwoorl City n~sirlent summerlup
the problem by stating:
It is not uncommon to find bullets
lodged in front porches or gutters.
We are afraid for our children.
The random gunfire problem is also
costly in terms of law enforcement,
property damage, and declining
property values.
The number of deaths from firearmsrelated injuries is recognized as a significant national public health problem. In
the United States in 1996, for example,
there were 12.8 deaths per 100,000
people caused by firearms-related injuries. For males 15 to 24 years old, the
problem is even more staggering: in 1996,
there were 38.9 deaths from injuries sustained by firearms per 100,000 people. 11
;[!
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:s. The statistics also fail to differenuate between random gunfire and
other criminal incidents when shots are
fired, such as drive-by shootings, revenge
shootings, shootings during drug transactions, and so forth. As such, there is very
little systematic information about the
extent, environmental causes, social
context, and societal costs of the random
gunfire problem.

The study neighborhood
The Dallas study began with a systematic
analysis of the random gunfire problem
in that city's Oakcliff neighborhood. Researchers reviewed videotapes of street
block attributes, conducted onsite observations and interviews, and reviewed
police officer patrol logs to develop a
comprehensive view of factors contributing to the random gunfire problem.
Oak cliff is composed primarily of residential rental units mixed with light
industrial and commercial enterprises.
The community is situated between two
major commercial corridors with a park
and large lake on its northern border.
The majority of Oakcliff residents are
economically poor and lease their apartments. Fewer than 20 percent of the
Oak cliff residents own their own homes,
compared with a citywide ownership rate
of more than 50 percent and a nationwide
ownership rate of 59 percent. 12 The average monthly rent in the Oakcliff community is $295. By contrast, more than
90 percent of Dallas residents pay more
than $300 in rent per month, and, of
these renters, 41 percent pay $500 or
more per month. 1a
Oak cliff reports high levels of random
gunfire: 422 citizen reports of random
gunfire shots per 10,000 people per year
in thP 1-sfpum~-mile neigh horhoorl 11 lone.
Although random gunfire calls represented 1.1 percent of total police service ealls
citywide, they represented 4.6 percent of
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total calls for service in Oakcliff during 1996. Police report no random
gunfire calls for 65 percent of Oakcliff
streets (similar to call patterns for
other crime problems). However, a
small percentage (5.5 percent) of the
streets generated nearly 45 percent of
all random gunfire calls. 14
Researchers examined the social and
physical attributes of Oak cliff street
blocks that experienced random gunfire calls for service. These results are
specific to the Oakcliff neighborhood
and cannot be generalized to Dallas or
any other community in the United
States. The research shows predominately residential street blocks that
had higher property values or rental
fees experienced more random gunfire
calls for service than Oakcliff street
blocks with lower property values or
those comprising commercial properties or vacant blocks. 15 Random gunfire calls were not generally a problem
on Oakcliff street blocks that had a
large proportion of properties in disrepair or on streets with high levels of
physical decay, a lot of foliage, or on
blocks with relatively high levels of
calls about serious crime problems. 16
Random gunfire calls were more
prevalent on street blocks that generated a substantial number of prowler,
suspicious person, and disturbance
calls. This suggests other types of suspicious and unruly behavior are probably correlated with Oakcliffs random
gunfire problem.
The study findings are somewhat
inconsistent with crime and place
research that finds signs of decay are
indicative of other social and crime
problems. 17 Nevertheless, the study
findings suggest random gunfire may
be a unique type of crime problem not
necessarily part of, nor indicative of,
systemic decline and decay on a street
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block. The study results are consistent
with Dallas police officer perceptions
that random gunfire problems occur
in Oakcliffs residential areas, specifically in the context of people drinking
in their homes and backyards, watching sporting events, and celebrating.

Gunshot detection systems
What are they? Acoustic gunshot
detection systems are designed to pick
up the sound of a muzzle blast from a
gun and, within seconds of the shot being fired, pinpoint or triangulate within
some margin of error the gunshot's
location, before alerting the police
about the shot being fired.
Manufacturers of gunshot detection
systems expect the technology to increase the ability of the police to get to
the scene of random gunfire quickly,
increase the number of people arrested
for firing weapons, and reduce the detrimental effects (injuriP-s, fear, disinvestment) of shots being fired in urban
settings. Community advocates of
gunshot detection systems believe the
technology can deter would-be shooters and improve the quality of life in
their neighborhoods.
Alliant Techsystems Inc.'s
SECURES. The gunshot detection
system installed in Oakcliff was
developed and demonstrated by
Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATI) and
subsequently marketed as SECURES
(System for the Effective Control of
Urban Environment Security).
SECURES identifies the location and
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mitter. Eighty-six pole units were
erected in the 1-square-mile Oakcliff
target area to provide adequate system
coverage for the 2-month study
period. 18
The pole units are designed to acoustically identify gunshots and transmit
that information to a police dispatch
center through a network of transmitters and receivers connected to the
local phone system. The gunshot location and time are transmitted to a personal computer in the dispatch center
in less than 2 seconds, and the gunfire
information is displayed on a computerized map, enabling dispatchers to
relay the information to officers on
the street.
The SECURES prototype alerts police
dispatchers to the location of the first
pole unit to detect a shot. ATI claims,
however, that subsequent enhancements to the system "triangulate"
gunfire alerts such that real-time
information from responding pole units
pinpoint the precise location from
which the shot was fired. ATI claims
this type of "triangulation" procedure
can pinpoint 99 percent of gunshots
within a 65-foot radius of the firing
spot, 88 percent of gunshots within
30 feet, 63 percent of gunshots within
20 feet, and 35 percent of gunshots
within lO feet. 19
Trilon Technology's ShotSpotter.
The ShotSpotter gunshot detection
technology installed in Redwood City
was designed and demonstrated by
Trilon Technology. The ShotSpotter
system, installed in the 1-square-mile
Redwood Village area since early
1996, consists of eight acoustic sensors, a central computer located in the
Redwood City Police Department's
dispatch center, and gunshot detection
and location identification software.
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The acoustic sensors include microphones, acoustic sensing elements,
and gunshot identification electronics.
The sensors installed in Redwood Village resemble birdhouses and heating
vents and are enclosed in weatherproof
containers approximately 1 cubic foot
in size. The acoustic sensors detect
muzzle blasts from gunfire or other
explosions and then transmit the
sound of the gunfire via telephone
line to a central computer located in
a police department dispatch center.
Parameter settings in the ShotSpotter
software determine the system's level
of sensitivity: if the thresholds are set
quite high, background noise is less
often identified as gunfire. Conversely,
if the thresholds are set quite low,
more background noise can be detected as gunfire, increasing the potential that extraneous noises will be
incorrectly identified as gunfire. 20
Once the sensors detect a sound and
transmit the information to the central
computer, the ShotSpotter software
discriminates against most other community sounds (such as car backfires,
jackhammers, thunder, and barking
dogs) and pinpoints the location of the
gunfire or explosions. Gunshot events
are displayed on a computer map in
the police dispatch center within approximately 15 seconds of the noise
being made. The computer map distinguishes property boundaries, including
front or side yards, curbsides, or street
corners.
Determination of the precise location
of gunfire events is conducted through
a series of iterations of triangulation
algorithms. The system can generate
an overview map that presents the
locations of historical shootings to
discern patterns in space or time. The
ShotSpotter computer can be placed in
a dispatch center with stand-alone or
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integrated outputs, or it can be placed
at a remote site. 21
The ShotSpotter system stores all
waveforms for every detected gunfire
event and 6 seconds of audio from
each detecting acoustic sensor
(2.3 megabytes each). As such, a
significant amount of system memory
is required when numerous gunfire
events occur simultaneously or when
many noises are relayed to the system
in quick succession (during New
Year's Eve or Fourth of July, for example). Once the ShotSpotter system
detects a shot and reports the location
on the computer screen, dispatchers
can play back the 6-second snippet of
sound from any sensor to assist them
in determining what they believe to be
the true source of the sound: firecracker string, multiple gunshots,
shotgun blast, or car backfire. The
ability to play back the sound of the
apparent gunfire alert is unique to
ShotSpotter and offers police an opportunity to determine whether they think
the sound is in fact gunfire.

Do they work?
The Redwood City Police Department,
the San Mateo County Sheriffs Office,
and Trilon Technology agreed to submit the ShotSpotter system to a series
of field trials. The police department
approved the firing of test blanks under controlled conditions to measure
the performance of the technology in
June 1997. 22 Similar permissions were
not granted during the field test of the
SECURES system in Dallas.
The evaluation team worked with police department personnel to select
weapon types, the number of shots to
be fired, and the times and locations
from which test shots would be fired.
The police suggested that three
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weapon types be used: an MP5 assault
rifle, a .38 caliber pistol, and a 12
gauge shotgun. The police department
notified community residents and
business owners about the inordinate
number of shots that would be fired
during the field test to avoid calls from
concerned citizens about the gunfire.
All test shots were fired from sidewalks at intersections or along street
blocks.
The evaluation team assessed the
performance of the ShotSpotter system
based on three outcomes:
• Did the ShotSpotter gunshot
detection system annunciate and
triangulate the "shot" location
(true positive)?
• Did ShotSpotter fail to annunciate
or triangulate the "shot" location
(false negative)?
• What was the location error from
the true shot location to the triangulated shot location (in feet)?
Exhibit 1 presents the results of the
field trial, examining the breakdown of
results for each weapon type and each
of the evaluation outcomes (annunciation and location error).
Of the 31 field trial events, 8 tested
the MP5 assault rifle, 13 tested
the .38 caliber pistol rounds, and
10 tested the 12 gauge shotgun. The
technology annunciated shotgun tests
at the highest rate (90 percent), followed by pistol tests (77 percent), and
the MP5 assault rifle (63 percent).
Overall, the ShotSpotter technology
annunciated nearly 80 percent of the
test shots (true positives) and failed
to annunciate random gunfire events
about 20 percent of the time (false
negatives). It should be noted that the
muzzle blast waveform from blank
rounds is different from the muzzle

Researc

h

in

Br

Exhibit 1. Redwood City's ShotSpotter Field Trial Results
Total Number
of Gunfire
Events

Percent of
Shots
Annunciated

Median
Location
Error (In Feet)

MP5 Assault Rifle

8

63

27.0

.38 Caliber Pistol

13

77

25.0

12 Gauge Shotgun

10

90

23.5

blast waveform from live rounds; it can
be difficult for gunshot detection technologies to discriminate between the
two. 23 Therefore, the ShotSpotter technology should annunciate significantly
more than 80 percent of gunfire incidents when live rounds are fired under
real-life conditions.
The ShotSpotter system identified and
triangulated random gunfire events
within about 25 feet of the true shot
location. Shotgun events had the lowest median location error of 23.5 feet;
pistol events were correctly identified
within 25 feet of the true shot location;
and the MP5 assault rifle tests were
identified within 27 feet of the correct
firing location.

Random gunfire alerts and
police response
Citizen reporting of a gunshot fired is
typically dependent on (1) the citizen
hearing the shot, (2) the citizen identifying the noise to be gunfire, (3) the
citizen making the decision to call the
police shortly after the shot has been
fired, and (4) the citizen telling the
police the location from which the
shot was fired. Prior to the introduction of the gunshot detection system in
Dallas, the police took approximately
20 minutes to dispatch a citizen call
about random gunfire and an additional 5 minutes to respond (arrive on
the scene) to citizen alerts in the study
area. This response pattern was con-

sistent with the low priority response
the police department placed on random gunfire calls. Officers typically
stayed on the scene of a call for about
15 minutes. In total, citizens' random
gunfire reporting calls took approximately 40 minutes to clear from the
time the call was placed to the time
the officer concluded the investigation
of the scene. 24
The introduction of gunshot detection
systems in Dallas removed the citizen
contingencies influencing random
gunfire reporting and somewhat
changed the patterns of police response. During the field trial in Dallas,
the police received 188 alerts of gunfire from the SECURES system and
49 citizen calls. They subsequently
dispatched 151 of the SECURES
alerts and 39 of the citizen calls. 25
The police dispatched both citizen
calls and SECURES alerts quicker
during the field trial (13 minutes and
18 minutes, respectively) than before
the introduction of the gunshot location system. The police continued to
take about 5 minutes to arrive on
the scene for a citizen alert and about
7 minutes for a SECURES alert. Once
on the scene, the police cleared the
citizen call quicker (12 minutes) than
before the field trial, yet they took
significantly longer to clear the
SECURES alert (19 minutes). It is
possible the police spent less time on
citizen calls about random gunfire due
to the greater total number of random
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gunfire alerts generated by the gunshot
location system and the subsequent
increase in the number of dispatches
for random gunfire alerts. 26 Overall,
the Dallas police received and cleared
citizen random gunfire calls in about
30 minutes, and they received and
cleared SECURES alerts in about
44 minutes during the field trial.

Using gunshot detection
systems
During the 2-month Dallas field trial,
the police made 190 radio runs (151
SECURES ale!ts and 39 citizen random
gunfire calls) in the 1-square-mile
Oakcliff community. 27 The number of
citizen calls during the field trial was
similar to the average number of citizen calls to the police about random
gunfire incidents prior to the field
trial. 28 As such, the extra SECURESdispatched radio runs over and above
the citizen-initiated calls during the
field trial represent an almost fivefold
increase (190/39=4.87) in the number
of police dispatches to random gunfire
problems.
Alliant Techsystems Inc. claims
SECURES correctly identifies 88
percent of all shots whose propagation
path to the microphone is not blocked
by a close building. 29 The acoustic
database used to support this claim
was collected by ATI during tests
conducted at military proving grounds
and police test ranges and when live
rounds were fired in open field environments as well as among building
structures. 30 Thus, assuming theSECURES true-positive rate is correct,
the field trial suggests that many random gunfire incidents are not reported
by citizens. 31
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How should the police respond to an
inordinate increase in random gunfire
alerts? Indeed, introduction of the
technology challenges the police to
carefully consider the manner in
which they mobilize their resources to
respond to alerts: on the one hand, the
technology provides police with much
more information about random gunfire problems than previously generated through citizen calls. If the ATI
claim that SECURES fails to detect
only 12 percent of all shots and if the
citizen reporting figure of 23 percent
of all random gunfire incidents in the
Dallas field trial is accurate, 32 then
one can reasonably conclude that gunshot detection systems provide the
police with important insights as to
the nature, extent, and locations of
random gunshots.
On the other hand, the increase in random gunfire alerts has the potential to
significantly influence the delivery of
police services. The nearly fivefold increase in radio dispatches represents a
significant increase in the police
workload for a very small geographic
area (less than 1 square mile). Moreover, during the study period, not a
single arrest was made in response to a
dispatch for random gunfire in Dallas,
and police officers patrolling Oakcliff
spent less time processing citizen calls
for random gunfire during the field test
(compared with the time spent on
citizen calls before the field trial) to
handle the large increase in radio runs
generated by the SECURES technology. 33

What do police think of
gunshot detection systems?
Patrol officers from both the Dallas
and Redwood City police departments
were surveyed about their perceptions
of the impact of gunshot detection
systems on their work routine, their
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confidence in the technology to report
gunfire incidents, and their perceptions of the ability of the technology
to improve police effectiveness in
handling such incidents. All officers
assigned to areas in which the technology was deployed and they could
possibly be dispatched to gunshot incidents received questionnaires. In
Dallas, 58 percent (124 of 212) of
patrol officers completed the questionnaires, while in Redwood City, 66
percent (27 of 41) of patrol officers
returned the questionnaires.
As happens with many technological
and strategic innovations introduced
into police departments, 34 patrol officers from both Dallas and Redwood
City reported some frustrations with
the gunshot detection systems. They
generally lacked confidence in the
ability of the systems to identify and
locate gunfire occurrences. They also
worried about false alerts, and they
expressed concern about the time
spent responding to gunfire alerts and
the low likelihood of catching or arresting the shooter.
Officers in both cities feel they are
more likely to talk with citizens when
responding to citizen-generated calls
than to gunshot detection system calls,
and they make more problem-solving
progress on citizen alerts than technology alerts. Generally, officers feel
citizen calls about gunfire give them
a focal point in responding to the call.
Officers can ask the citizen about what
he or she heard, and they can glean
details about the context of the shot
fired. By contrast, officers explain that
the gunshot detection systems provide
no details about the apparent shot,
leaving them without any guidance to
pursue an investigation.
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Summing up
The study of the use of gunshot detection technology in local law enforcement led the research team to four
broad conclusions:
• Gunshot detection systems are
likely to reveal rather high citizen
under-reporting rates of random
gunfire problems.
• The technology is likely to increase
the workloads of police officers,
particularly if departments dispatch
a patrol unit to every gunfire incident detected by a technological
system.
• Gunshot detection systems are not
likely to lead to more arrests of
people firing weapons in urban settings because it is highly unlikely
that offenders will stay at a gunshot
location long enough for the police
to arrive. 35
• Finally, gunshot detection systems
seem to offer the most potential as
a problem-solving tool and would
fit nicely within the emerging
problem-oriented policing paradigm. The technology can help
police identify random gunfire hot
spots and develop strategies to
address the problem.
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Officers were dispatched to the first pole unit
that recorded a shots-fired incident rather than
a triangulated location identified through a
series of detections by numerous pole units.
(Based on an Oct. 30, 1996, interview with
ATI personnel.)
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20. Muzzle blasts from gunfire have distinctive
waveforms, as do the sounds from other similar
sources. However, the setting parameters determine what level of extraneous noise will trip
the system. Hence, the less sensitive the parameter settings, the less likely it is that jackhammers, thunder, and car backfires will set
the system off (false positives). Alternatively,
the more sensitive the parameter settings, the
more likely it is that extraneous noise will trip
the system.
21. The system can be its own operating system
within the dispatch center, or it can be linked
into the dispatch system's operating system.
22. The original proposal was to discharge live
rounds of ammunition. However, numerous
discussions with the police chief, his advisers,
and personnel from Trilon Technology led to
an agreement to discharge blanks as opposed to
live rounds. Although the amplitude waves
generated by blanks are not identical to the
amplitude waves generated by live ammunition,
they were close enough for the blanks to serve
as adequate substitutes.
23. Personal communication with John Collins,
ed., Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners Journal, Nov. 9, 1999.
24. Comparative response time data were not
readily available in Redwood City. Calls were
placed to both the San Mateo County Sheriff's
Office and the Redwood City Police Department. Only selected calls were available for
analysis from the police department data,
compromising a complete analysis of their
call data.
25. Mazerolle, Lorraine Green, Cory Watkins,
Dennis Rogan, and James Frank, "Using Gunshot Detection Systems in Police Departments:
The Impact on Police Response Times and
Officer Workloads," Police Quarterly l (2)
1998: 21-49.
26. Ibid.
27. There were 151 SECURES alert "events"
that were not linked at any time to a citizen
call and resulted in a radio run. There were
39 citizen alert events during the study period
resulting in 39 radio runs. Of these 39 citizeninitiated radio runs, 10 included a SECURES
alert that was "referenced" to a citizen call.
That is, the call-taker and/or dispatcher linked
the SECURES call to the citizen call and dispatched it as a citizen call. As such, a total
of 190 radio runs for random gunfire alerts
were made during the study period: 151 that
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involved the technology only, 29 that involved
citizen calls only, and 10 that were dispatched
as citizen calls but involved a combination of
citizens and SECURES initiating the alert.
28. See Mazerolle eta!., "Using Gunshot
Detection Systems in Police Departments:
The Impact on Police Response Times and
Officer Workloads."
29. Page and Sharkey, "SECURES: System for
Reporting Gunshots in Urban Environments":
170.
30. Ibid.: 162.
31. The research team cannot provide any
independent measure of this claimed falsepositive rate because no field test of SECURES
was conducted in Dallas where blank or live
rounds were fired under field trial conditions.
32. The 23-percent citizen reporting rate was
reached in the following manner: using the
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baseline of 151 SECURES-initiated radio runs
during the 2-month field trial, researchers applied the 12-percent error rate to identify 169
estimated shots. The 39 citizen-initiated radio
runs over the test period were divided by the
169 estimated incidents to identify the
23-percent reporting rate (39/169xl00).
33. Officers in both cities believe they tend to
respond quicker to gunshot detection system
calls than citizen-generated calls. Some officers explained they merely want to clear the call
quickly and move on to the next call. It is reasonable to expect that the police would spend
more time handling calls that they thought
worthwhile. Possible explanations for these
apparent contradictory findings: (I) the police
"leave open" the SECURES alerts longer because there is no citizen waiting to talk with
them when they arrive, and they move on to the
next call; (2) police deal with a citizen-initiated
alert in a more expedient manner because
there is a set of standard procedures to follow
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(i.e., visit the caller, elicit information from
them, and then take a look around). This is not
the case for the SECURES alerts. The police
get to the scene and then have to knock on a
few doors to gather information about the
gunfire.
34. Chatterton, Michael, "Targeting Community Beat Officers: Organisational Constraints
and Resistance," Policing and Society 3
(1993): 189-203.
35. One caveat here is the initiative recently
announced by Trilon Technology called
"The Communicator," which is linked with the
ShotSpotter system to systematically place calls
to households and businesses within a close
geographic area of the gunfire alert to inform
them of the incident. If the citizen has information, he or she can press a key on a touch-tone
phone to be immediately transferred to a live
dispatcher.
Findings and conclusions of the research
reported here are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official position or
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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